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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XIV

APPENDIX.
JUNE 16, 1862. — Engagement at Secessionville, James Island, S.C.(*)

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[Inclosure No. 13]

BRIEF STATEMENT AS TO THE JAMES ISLAND AFFAIR.

In my report to General Hunter, I reminded him that he had himself approved the movement, and, although I was at once deprived of command and put in arrest under the verbal pretense of disobedience of orders, he has never preferred any such charge against me officially. I can find nothing at the War Department in the way of accusation, except two letters of General Hunter, one of June 27, forwarding a letter of General Stevens of June 22, with indorsement of General Wright, and another of July 10, forwarding a letter of General Stevens of July 8, which was printed in the New York Times of July 16, in neither of which does General Hunter call for or suggest any action against me.

In his first letter, General Hunter assumes that the letter of General Stevens states that my subordinate generals warned me that I "was about to fight a battle in violation of orders." This assumption, however, General Stevens' letter will not warrant. He says simply that I "was warned that under" "my" orders they were going to fight "a battle," and in a subsequent card published in the New York Times, July 22, he fully refutes General Hunter's assumption, saying that "General Hunter's orders to General Benham were not a matter brought before the conference."

General Stevens' letter is a very artful production, and wonderfully calculated to deceive. He assumes that I had said that he and General Wright favored the attack. I never said so, only that they did not oppose it; and Captain Drayton, who was present at the conference, sustains me in this, when he states that if they were opposed to it, "none of them, however, said so much as this." General Stevens also alleges that he was opposed to the attack on the morning of the 16th, and that he understood that; General Wright was opposed to it, but neither does he nor General Wright say that General Wright or Colonel Williams expressed themselves so opposed, while Captain Drayton states that neither of them expressed any opposition. General Stevens indeed opposed making the attack in the morning, or rather he proposed its being made in the afternoon. That he absolutely favored an attack I had every reason to believe from a letter I had from him on the 7th, proposing for the 9th the details for a "dash, with every man thrown in," and at "daylight to seize the lower part of James Island," embracing, of course, this battery; to receive which letter I was waked up at I o'clock in the morning, though my headquarters were but a few hundred yards from General Stevens'.

The simple facts were, first, that this battery covered our main landing and essentially commanded our camps; second, that the first order to attack this battery was issued by me with the full knowledge and approbation of General Hunter; third, that while this attack was in preparation, General Hunter's order (draughted by myself) directing me "not to advance on Charleston," 10 miles, and not to "attack Fort Johnson," 7 miles distant, but ordering me to "provide for a secure intrenched encampment, where my front could be covered by the fire of the gunboats from the Stone on the left and the creek from Folly River on the right," was issued by him; fourth, that circumstances having delayed the execution of my first order to attack, it became, in my judgment, absolutely necessary to renew it alter his departure from the Stono, and, therefore, in obedience to a military necessity, to prevent our being driven from the island, as well as in obedience to the order of General Hunter, to secure our camps and enable our gunboats to ascend the Folly River Creek, which could not otherwise be done, I ordered the attack which was made on the 16th; fifth, I did not advance one yard on the route to Charleston or Fort Johnson, in attempting to obey the second branch of General Hunter's order, which was a necessity, while the first was a mere expediency; sixth, General Stevens had nearly 4,000 troops with which to carry an earthwork defended by less than 600 men, and he disobeyed my positive orders, "to be upon the work by the earliest daylight," and "with loaded muskets," by starting, as he did, so as to reach there after sunrise, and by ordering them "not to lead ;" seventh, General Stevens was not personally with his troops in the battle, and he ordered them to withdraw after the guns of the enemy had been silenced, and when the work was essentially within the grasp of his men, he being, by the best evidence I can obtain, fully seven-eighths of a mile distant, and unaware of uhis own success. If the attack failed, as I claim by no fault of mine, but by reason of the disobedience and bad management of my subordinate, I ought not to be judged without a hearing, much less should I be punished upon the essentially false statements of a junior, made after I had left the department, and which otherwise he had never ventured to suggest.

The papers corroborative of the above statement are the letters of General Hunter of June 27 and July 10, 1862, and the letter of General Stevens of June 20 [22], and his denial card dated July 20, and published July 22; also letter of Captain Drayton of' June 18, and order of General Hunter of June 10, together with my notes upon them, respectively, with which may be considered my notes on a letter to me from Colonel Hawley, the commander of the leading brigade during its advance to the assault, with extracts from published rebel accounts, and a map of the position, with notes and explanations, all herewith respectfully submitted; also an affidavit sent me that General Stevens was heard to say he believed the attack would be successful.(*) The following affidavit was offered to Capt. A. B. Ely, the assistant, adjutant-general of General Benham, in Boston, after the publication in the newspapers that General Stevens did not expect success:

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, Suffolk, ss:

I.                 William O'Connor, of Boston, Mass., on oath, declare and say, that I am a mariner; that I was employed as such in the Department of the South; that I was coxswain of the gig used by General H. W. Benham on the Stone River during the occupation of James Island by the Federal forces; that, I was in the boat the night of the 13th of June, before the battle of James Island, and carried General Benham and General Stevens between the shore and the steamer Delaware on the evening before the battle: that I heard General Benham say to General Stevens, "Do you think we can succeed?" and General Stevens' reply, "I think we can."

II.               WILLIAM O'CONNOR.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 21st August, 1862.

J. W. PRESTON, Justice of the Peace for Suffolk County.

The letter of General Stevens, forwarded with this [Hunter to Stanton, July 10, 1862, p. 48], was elated July 8, and published in the New York Times, July 16. The sum of the allegations in it is, that the generals strongly remonstrated with General Benham against the attack.

The, only reference to Generals Wright and Stevens in General Benham's letter of June 20 to General Hunter is in the following paragraph:

Those orders of General Hunter, I may say, were made known to General Stevens and to General Wright, and that neither of them ever intimated or appeared to think that the movement upon the fort on the 16th would be contrary to those orders — orders I most heartily approved and was most anxious to carry out.

Here nothing is stated to the effect that either General Wright or General Stevens favored the proposed attack; but that they did favor it might well be supposed when General Wright's letters of May 16 and 22 say, "Once on James Island and the gunboats in the Stono, and the thing is done to all intents and purposes. Taking possession of the Stono solves the question of the taking of Charleston. It is no longer anything but a question of time;" and General Stevens' letter, received June 7, suggests "an armed reconnaissance and a dash day after to-morrow (daylight), in order to seize James Island below James River and Newtown Cut, with every man thrown in," which included the taking of this battery, the final failure to take which compelled the abandonment of the island.

[Extract from a card by General Stevens, published in the New York Times. July 22, 1862]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, BURNSIDE EXPEDITION,
Newport News, Va., Sunday, July 20, 1862.

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

I desire to correct an error either of the printer or copyist in my official report to General Hunter. In the copy as printed in your issue of the 16th instant it is stated, "General Wright warned General Benham that his orders were, in fact, orders not to fight a battle? It should read, "General Wright warned General Benham that his orders were, in fact, orders to fight a battle," meaning thereby General Benham's own orders to his subordinates in relation to the operations of the morrow, and that a battle must inevitably result from them, and not General Hunter's orders to General Benham, which were not a matter brought before the conference.(*)

Very respectfully, yours,

ISAAC I. STEVENS.

The above refutes General Hunter's assumption of June 27.

That the subordinate, generals did not remonstrate with General Benham is positively shown by the following letter from Captain Drayton, U. S. Navy, who was at the conference, he being the commanding or senior naval officer:

UNITED STATES STEAMER PAWNEE,

Stono, June 18, 1862.

Brig. Gen. H. W. BENHAM,
Commanding at the Stono:

SIR: In answer to your letter of the 17th, just received, I beg to state that, in the meeting referred to, in it, I cannot recollect any opposition being offered to your proposed advance on Secessionville the following morning, except as regarded the time you had fixed on, Brigadier-General Stevens being in favor of deferring it until the afternoon. Although, however, no direct objections were made, I judged from a series of questions which were put to General Stevens by General Wright, in regard to the effect produced, or likely to be produced, on the enemy's works by the battery of the latter (former), that he was not in favor of a forward movement at the present time.

I cannot call to mind any particular expressions of Colonel Williams which would enable me to form any opinion as to his views, but must confess that the impression was made on me by the general tone of the conversation that, while expressing every desire to further your views to the utmost of their power, the three officers above named were scarcely in favor of the movement. None of them, however, said as much this, and General Wright did observe that we would take the battery, he thought.

The only change made in your first plan of operations, so far as I could see, was to defer the movement a half hour later than first intended by you.

Yours, very truly,

P. DRAYTON.

These [expressions of Colonel Williams] were, "Has your battery had any effect yet?" "Do you expect it to have any?" To both questions General Stevens replied, "No," and, of course, giving more reason for an early attack.

The following is General Hunter's order: (*)

There were fifteen regiments and two large batteries of artillery to "provide a secure encampment" for, and in the space fixed by General Hunter in the second paragraph there was not over about one-fourth of a square mile of dry land not covered by the fire of the rebel battery at Secessionville. Consequently, the reduction of this battery was a necessary, in order, first, to afford the troops necessary camping ground, and, second, to enable light draught gunboats to ascend the creek from Folly River, on the right, so as to cover our front, which, as it was commanded by that battery, they could not do.

General Benham, on June 10, ordered a reconnaissance for the next morning, stating, "it being deemed important that the batteries of the enemy which have borne upon oar camps at Thomas Grimbali's to-day should be closely reconnoitered or broken up, if possible, at the earliest moment, * * * a rush will be made upon and toward them at between 3.30 o'clock and the earliest daylight."(+) This was read to and approved by General Hunter, and he delayed his departure from the Stono one day after he had issued his order of the 10th, to learn the result of this reconnaissance, which was then pending. In consequence of an attack of the enemy on our lines on the afternoon of the 10th, the reconnaissance ordered for the 11th was postponed, and was again ordered for the 16th, in obedience to the terms of General Hunter's order, as well as to the military necessities of the case.

On the 30th of August, General Benham first met Colonel Hawley after the James Island affair; and, after giving much verbal information, he the next day addressed General Benham a long letter of detail upon the information contained, in which is offered the following notes on a letter (of ten pages, dated August 31, 1862) from Col. J. R. Hawley, Seventh Connecticut Regiment, the commander of the leading brigade at the first of the assaults on the rebel battery on James Island. The letter of Colonel Hawley gives information on several important particulars previously unknown to me, both as to the march of General Wright across John's Island and as to the attack on Secessionville by General Stevens.

As to General Wright, it was arranged with him for a previous twenty-four hours' notice, that he might rapidly cross the Edisto and march to the Stono, 15 miles, to unite with the rear column on arriving there, for a coup de main across James' Island for the seizure of Fort Johnson. It appears from this letter that General Wright had his infantry 5 miles out on June 2, and it is certain the eight pieces of his artillery, and a part, at least, of his cavalry over, so that the mass, if not all, of his effective strength was over, and within about 10 miles, by a good road, of the Stone and of our rear (then advanced column); and it did not rain any of consequence, if at all, for twenty-five or thirty hours after; and General Wright, for a portion of his horses or cavalry only, as it appears (not needed for his effective strength), remained there without moving for three nights and two days, consuming his rations, and for the last half of the time in severe rains in open bivouac; while the enemy, then knowing our point of attack, sent, as we learned, over 15,000 men from Savannah, and the dash across James Island, to bring Charleston under our guns, became impossible for our small force.

And, as to General Stevens' attack on the Secessionville fort, my orders were for Stevens' whole force to be upon the outer picket line (about a half mile beyond the causeway) before 3 a.m., and "before good aiming light, and with guns loaded." By Colonel Hawley's letter it appears that General Stevens "ordered him not to load;" that before his column moved to the causeway and picket line it was light enough to distinguish persons "75 yards distant," and, on coming in sight of the work, "to see a man at that distance," as he estimated, "700 yards ;" that the brigades (of three regiments each) were ordered up (and, of course, by the commander, General Stevens) in brigade line on this converging piece of ground between the two marshes, by which "four out of the six" regiments "were sent clear of the works into the marsh;" that General Stevens was not on the ground to rectify the error, but at Legare's house in rear (which is seven-eighths of a mile from the fort); that Colonel Fenton came up while Colonel Hawley was extricating his men from the marsh, and ordered him across the front of fire of the fort, within 120 yards distance, and that when thus across, and within "about 100 yards," and "advancing Steadily," to support the Eighth Michigan and Seventy-ninth New York, then (as Lieutenant Colonel Morrison, of the Seventy-ninth, told me) in the ditch awaiting this support for the next assault, Captain Stevens galloped up, and, in General Stevens' name, ordered the men back, and this when the guns of the fort were silenced and the advance were only awaiting this support. This shows fully that General Stevens disobeyed my orders as to the loading of the muskets and as to the starting hour, for it was, in fact, after sunrise when the fort opened on him; that he most injudiciously arranged his troops for the assault, and, remaining himself about seven-eighths of a mile in the rear, he did not and could not correct that bad arrangement; and that when the regiments had recovered from the confusion and were advancing to support the men at the parapet and ditch, his son and assistant adjutant general came forward and ordered them back, thus giving up all the chances of success to the affair, Colonel Hawley stated to me, verbally, that he judged it/to be only about ten minutes from the time he first met the obstruction of the marsh in his advance till he was ordered back by Captain Stevens; also that he never saw General Stevens more than 2 rods in front of the road at Legare's house.

The published rebel accounts state (from Charleston Mercury, in New York Journal of Commerce, of June 26, 1862):

But 25 of the garrison were awake. It was a complete surprise, and nothing but the nerve and promptitude of the officers, especially the commanding officer, saved the battery from easy capture. The first round was fired when the column was within 30 yards of the guns; the wearied men, startled by the sound or aroused by shakes or bayonet punches from the officers, going to their guns.

And to this it need simply be remarked, if the attack after sunrise was such a surprise, how much more completely successful must it have been if executed when ordered at daylight.

It may be added in reference to General Wright's delay, that Capt. J. Hamilton (General Wright's chief of artillery) states in letters of November 19 and 20, 1862, that six pieces of his artillery were posted at the Haulover Cut on the afternoon and evening of June 2, and that the two remaining pieces were across the Edisto the same evening about 8 p.m., and started at 1 a.m. of the 3d to join him at the Cut, as they did about 7 a.m. This shows that all General Wright's artillery were over, as Colonel Hawley states all his infantry was across and at the Haulover Cut.

Further, in reference to the statement of General Hunter, in letter of July 10, that the three officers all "represented the movement as one almost impossible of accomplishment," I will state positively that to a remark of mine to General Wright, that I felt "the attack must be a certain success," his reply was, "Oh, we can take the battery," and I aver that this was said without qualification, though Captain Drayton appears to think he heard the words, "he thought" added. And as to General Stevens, a person who it appears had charge of the boat that took General Stevens and myself to the steamer Delaware from the "conference," met my adjutant-general in Boston and stated to him that he heard the question put directly by myself to General Stevens during that return, if he "thought we should be successful," and to this General Stevens replied in the affirmative, of which fact this man's affidavit has been sent me, and it is not pretended that Colonel Williams ever said one word on the subject either way.

And as I have been informed that General Hunter has given as a reason for sending me from the department the want of confidence felt in me by my command there, it is due to myself to state the following facts: Upon the evening of the 16th of June, after the attack and repulse. I was requested to meet those three officers, Generals Wright and Stevens and Colonel Williams, at the headquarters of the former, where they had lice, together some hours. And upon arriving there, after a short time spent in general conversation on the events of the day, in which not one word was said to the effect that any person had objected to the movement, or that I myself was in the slightest degree to blame or responsible for the failure, Colonel Williams stood up and addressed me at some length, the other two officers most markedly appearing to assent to his remarks, among which were the following expressions, which I distinctly recollect: "General Benham, you must push General Hunter aside; you must send some one of your own staff to Washington to demand re-enforcements, and we will hold on to this position till they come, and we can make the attack on Charleston. You must push General Hunter aside." To which my reply was, "No, gentlemen; General Hunter has been too kind to me for it to be possible that I should do anything of this kind; but I will do all I can to hold this place, as I think we ought to, till we can get re-enforcements? This, I am satisfied, Colonel Williams will not deny, and it shows conclusively whether those officers then blamed or had lost confidence in myself, and the whole plan of the expedition, as well as of the attack, was entirely my own, as General Stevens took occasion to say to me explicitly the next day.

H. W. BENHAM.

[Sub-inclosure]

ASTOR HOUSE,
New York, August 31, 1862.

General H. W. BENHAM:

GENERAL: I take advantage of a few hours' leisure, while awaiting the departure of the steamer for Port Royal, to answer briefly the inquiries you made yesterday.

Last May I was at Fort Pulaski as lieutenant-colonel, commanding the Seventh Connecticut (my present commission not having arrived). Under your orders, the regiment embarked on the Cosmopolitan on the night of May 31. You remember the errors which led the captain of the steamer to land us at North Edisto, instead of taking us directly to General Stevens' command, on the Stone.

I reported to General H. G. Wright, at North Edisto, on Sunday afternoon, June 1. My arrival was unexpected, and while he was de liberating upon the disposal of the regiment, your order came to cross that night to John's Island (or Seabrook's, a part of John's). Tumbling ashore all our tents and baggage, lint two loads of ammunition, hospital stores, and provisions, and leaving all who were likely to prove noneffective in a fatiguing march, and, possibly, a fight, I went over to the pontoon wharf on John's Island. The tide was strong, and, in spite of careful management, the steamer struck and seriously injured the wharf, so that I was obliged to land my men and baggage by small boats. The commanding officer of the gunboat Crusader very kindly lent me large boat, and furnished a good crew, who worked all night. The morning was far advanced before I could possibly get ready to march. Other regiments and the battery and cavalry were brought over by the Planter and the May Flower, which could come up to the disabled wharf'. A portion of the battery and most of the infantry started before I did. (I forgot to mention that three companies of the Forty-sixth NewYork, under Captain -------, were attached to us, it having been found impossible to take the whole of the Forty-sixth from Tybee, as was intended.)

We moved at noon on the 2d. It was exceedingly hot, and, going on toot myself, I regulated the march most carefully. The Third New Hampshire and a portion of the battery passed us on the way. Arriving within a mile of Haulover Cut, we found a portion of the force halted and another portion returning from a road on the right, which it was said it had taken by mistake. I think it was not far from 4 o'clock, possibly a little later, when we arrived at the Cut. Two regiments, at least (the Sixth Connecticut Volunteers was one of them), had crossed the causeway and bridge, and occupied the rising ground about the large house. Before sunset the infantry (all, I am quite sure), a portion at least of the artillery, which was composed of Hamilton's or Ransom's battery, and a section of the Rhode Island, and some of the cavalry had arrived at the Cut. We bivouacked, my command forming the reserve, perhaps 40 yards from the causeway. On this ground we remained Monday night and until Thursday morning. During Tuesday the cavalry continued to come up. I cannot say positively whether or not all got there before Wednesday. I think, but I will not positively say, that a section or so of the artillery did not get there until Tuesday. I had been ordered to leave Pulaski with three days' cooked rations and five uncooked (the intention having been, as before stated, to send us to the Stono directly). As my cooked rations would run out Tuesday night, I took advantage of the delay to run my single wagon (one had been lost in unloadling in the Edisto) back to the landing for the rations I had been obliged to leave there. Wednesday there was much regret expressed at the delay, and many of the regiments began to get out of food. All the transportation at command, including what could be detached from the artillery, was most actively employed in running back about 5 miles to the landing for provisions, &c. We understood at the time that the delay was unavoidable on account of the defective transportation and the great labor of bringing over the artillery and cavalry and the horses and wagons belonging to the infantry.

General Wright came on Wednesday, not till afternoon, I think, having remained at the Edisto to drive the work. There was a hasty review of the force toward sunset on Wednesday.

Sunday and Monday were pleasant days. Tuesday and Tuesday night it rained most heavily, and some rain fell on Wednesday, though I do not find that my letters to my wife (which I consult for some of these facts) make any mention of that.

In conversations at the time (without reference to official returns) the officers considered the force as amounting to about 5,000, including the artillery, eight pieces, and about 600 of the First Massachusetts Cavalry, Colonel Williams, or rather Lieutenant-Colonel Sargent, the colonel acting as brigadier-general.

On Thursday morning, June 5, at 2 o'clock, the troops were ready to move: at 2.30 we started. The Third New Hampshire led. Next came a section of artillery; then my command. It was very cloudy and dark, and soon after we moved a very heavy rain began, which continued, with slight intervals of drizzling, until we reached Legateville. I think I came up to the village about 9.30 a.m.; you assigned us quarters.

While we staid at Haulover, the enemy's mounted scouts were several times seen, and we confidently expected opposition in our march of 13 miles to Legareville. We met none whatever, but we heard afterward that a considerable force of the enemy came down there the day after we left.

Some of your questions were concerning the fight near Secessionville. The Seventh Connecticut was on James Island, in General Stevens' division (called the Second until about the 20th of June, when it became the First). The First Brigade was composed of the Eighth Michigan, Colonel Fenton, commanding the brigade; the Seventh Connecticut Volunteers, and the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts; the Second [Brigade], the Seventy-ninth New York, One hundredth Pennsylvania, Colonel Leasure, commanding the brigade, and the Forty-sixth New York.

Late at night, June 15, I received orders to form my regiment on the color line at 1 a.m. of the coming morning, in light marching order, with 60 rounds per man and one day's cooked rations, and there await orders. The [order] was precisely and punctually obeyed. I was then ordered to wait until the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts moved, and to follow it. I obeyed, and it was between 1.30 and 2 when we took the road behind them. On coming to Colonel Fenton's, we exchanged places with the Twenty-eighth, and became the second regiment, the Eighth Michigan taking the had. During the halt in the field just east of Colonel Fenton's headquarters, I received orders from General Stevens himself; also from Colonel Fenton, through his aide, Lieutenant Belcher, not to load, to move in perfect silence, and to trust to the bayonet. Before this, I had ascertained that the Eighth Michigan had loaded, and I had followed its example. I so stated, and was told positively not to fire. I asked if no discretion was left me, and was told (this was by Mr. Belcher) that, in the last emergency, I might do as I pleased in self-defense.

The line moved till the head rested near the causeway. While waiting here, I was instructed, through Lieutenant Belcher, to be ready when the proper time came to move into line on the left of the Eighth Michigan, and to watch and guard against any movement of the enemy on its left. Shortly after, the division started in perfect silence, crossed the causeway, passed through a field, then took into and through a cornfield. Near the eastern edge of this stood a house, used as a hospital during the fight, and, at its close, burned. I have made a very rough sketch of the ground where our division fought, and refer to it.(*) Near this house the enemy's pickets fired into the Eighth Michigan, and were captured. The Eighth started forward with a prolonged yell, and we kept close behind. As I passed through the hedge, at A, I received word from Lieutenant Belcher to move on the right into line. I observed the Eighth Michigan getting into line as at C, and my regiment hurried on at the double-quick, over the cotton rows, by companies, as indicated at B, soon getting a good line as at D, at which time the Eighth Michigan appeared as at E. Clambering over the second hedge, I caught my first good view of the earthwork.

You ask about the time. It is utterly impossible for me to tell. Before we started to cross the causeway, I remember noticing, and easily distinguishing, General Stevens and party at the distance of, perhaps, 75 yards, and when we crossed the second hedge I could perfectly well see the window in the gable of the little house in the earthwork. There soon came a flash from it. The lookout or tower was clearly distinguishable, and I could have seen a man at that distance. I saw that the work presented a short front, and, supposing that to be the object of attack, though not forgetting my injunctions to protect the left of the Eighth, I told my color-bearers to direct their steps toward the right, but suddenly I found my left wing plunging into low bushes and marsh, and unavoidably breaking into confusion, while the right moved steadily on. Rifle and grape shot poured upon us heavily. The line staggered and halted as at F, say 120 yards from the work, though single men and groups pressed nearer. The men edged back a little, but did not run, or even intend to walk away. The Twenty-eighth came up on my left, obliquing as they saw the marsh, but soon got into the same difficulty, and fell back to the first hedge, or near there, to reform. I got our colors into the open field, and reformed my line under a constant fire, as at G. Colonel Fenton came up during our labors at reforming. A portion of my men were permitted to fire, and made good use of their opportunities, but I soon stopped it, as I feared it might interfere with somebody's scaling the work. Colonel Fenton ordered us to move by the right flank across the fire, and we obeyed. When partly across the field, the Seventy-ninth(*) came up, advancing in line of battle, striking across and somewhat disturbing my left. We soon after filed to the left, and were in the position indicated by the dotted lines at H, I myself being at the place marked X, near the H, and hurrying to the head of my men, when Captain Stevens galloped up to me, saying, "The general wishes you to call the men off." The rifle fire at this moment was very sharp from the enemy's left, and my first and second companies were suffering, but advancing steadily. The head was, perhaps, 100 yards from the work. I do not remember noticing any abatis on the front; it might have been there. All my energies were directed to cheering and regulating my men. We faced about and walked steadily, faced by the rear rank, and followed by rifle balls, to the second hedge, where, by General Stevens' order, we halted and took shelter, as at I. After a time the general called us back to the first hedge. All but the last company had got through the opening, when the general said he wanted us again, and we faced about and reentered the open field, where I completely reformed my regiment at K, equalizing companies, reassigning officers, &c. My left company (Sharps rifles) General Stevens retained to protect Rockwell's battery. General Stevens rode through the hedge, and looked on a few moments. At other times when I saw him he was where I have marked his position, + on the sketch, and where he had a good view of the field.

Soon after we moved again to I, and lay in the dry ditch, and two howitzers, and afterward a rifle of Rockwell's, came up, and, partly protected by the hedge, fired perhaps 100 rounds, so they said, my men, and I myself, assisting somewhat in moving the guns and serving ammunition. The howitzers started with grape, to clear the bushes on either side of the work, but I represented that many of our men must be about the field wounded, and the distance was so great that we should hurt them more than the enemy, and the gunners changed to spherical case. Captain Gray and myself watched closely the effects, and informed the gunners, at their request, as they fired very rapidly. They lost some horses at this place. The enemy fired grape and other shot, but the infantry kept their cover tolerably well, and were not hurt. In permitting my best marksmen to practice on the work from this point, I remarked that they might set their leaf sights at 700. I think my Enfield rifles rather inferior and they under-shoot. The distance must be full 500 yards from the second hedge to the work. After Rockwell's guns had got back to the first hedge, my men arose and marched with admirable steadiness back to the first hedge and filed through. Grape and heavy shot followed us, but hurt no one. We found the Seventy-ninth standing in line there. After some delay, General Stevens ordered us to camp.

Of course, I do not give all the details, but I am sure of what I have asserted. I knew in a general way that we were expected to surprise some work, but, aside from that, I have given all the orders that I received before or during the fight. I have never seen the report of a single regimental commander engaged in that battle, though I should be exceedingly glad to read them.

I have individually laid the failure of the attack to the adherence to the order to advance in brigade line. Had the other regiments followed in the footsteps of the Eighth Michigan, along the open field, or had none but my own (which sufficiently reconnoitered that marsh)been suffered to pitch into the mud and bushes, I have always thought that we should have taken the work. It was impossible that the regiments should come up in prompt support successively, when they were ordered forward in a direction that would have sent four out of the six clear of the work's right flank. I suppose that the Second Brigade was ordered forward like ours. The work had not the front of a regiment by a good deal.

l trust that I have not overstepped the bounds of propriety in my remarks, for I have no intention to do so. These same opinions I have always expressed, without knowing with whom any particular order originated, and having always been treated with the greatest kindness by my superior officers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,.

JOS. R. HAWLEY.

Notes on map.(*)

Colonel Hawley's verbal statement, on August 29, to me was that General Stevens once rode through the first hedge, "about 2 rods," to speak to him, after his regiment had been called back to that hedge, and that he had never seen him in advance of, or more than 2 rods in front of, that hedge during the day.

H. W. BENHAM.

Colonel Hawley also stated to me that from the time his regiment first encountered the marsh, at F, till he had reformed and brought, it to the position at H, advancing, and within 100 yards of the fort, when he was recalled by Captain Stevens, was about ten minutes, as near as he could judge.

H. W. BENHAM.

 

[Inclosure No. 14]

116 FOURTH STREET, NEW YORK,
January 10, 1863.

Hon. JOSEPH HOLT, Judge-Advocate-General:

DEAR SIR: In my interview with you on Saturday last, when I brought you from the President the papers relating to the case of General Benham, you will remember that there was among them a letter of General I. L Stevens, printed in the New York Times of July 22, 1862, of which you suggested to me that some authentication was necessary.

I have now the satisfaction of transmitting herewith the original of that document, which, as you suggested, was possible had been preserved in the New York Times office. I know not whether any authentication of such an original is important, but I add the depositions of Mr. Wilson, the managing editor, and of Mr. Fuller, the intimate friend and correspondent of General Stevens, in this city, authenticating the signature and proving the publication from this manuscript in the Times of that date.

Your kindness in permitting me on the occasion of that interview to direct your attention to some of the points of General Benham's case, emboldens me, as the friend perhaps most familiar with the facts of his defense, to beg that your particular attention may be directed to this document, as well as to another of much consequence, the letter and map of Colonel Hawley, of Seventh Connecticut Regiment. The facts in these two letters are new, and have never hitherto been laid before the authorities, though General Benham has been anxious to secure some attention to them. They are believed to be not only important, but, if carefully considered, absolutely decisive on all the important points of the alleged charges against him. Your kindness will, I trust, permit me to point out their bearing.

The main charge against him, so far as General Benham is informed, for his defense labors under the disadvantage of having no formal or accurate knowledge of what the charges are, is contained in two letters of General Hunter to the War Department, copies of which, with some notes of General Benham upon them, I left with you. The principal accusation contained in these letters is, that General Benham was warned on the evening before the battle, in a conference of the three generals on James Island, that he was about to fight a battle "in violation of orders."

This charge General Hunter presents on the authority of a report of General Stevens, respecting the facts of his own defeat. This concurrence of superior and subordinate officers in charging upon General Benham a willful and clear violation of orders was, it is believed, the only and sufficient ground of his disgraceful dismissal from the roll of brigadiers.

Upon the publication, however, of his report and letter to General Hunter, General Stevens made haste to correct his statement, and to disclaim, by this publication, the imputation which had thus, in his name, been cast upon General Behnam. In the printed letter, the authenticated original of which I now send, he declares this charge to have been a mistake, and that the orders under which General Benham was acting were not a subject before the conference.

This statement agrees with that of General Benham himself, and of Commodore Drayton, the impartial naval officer who witnessed the interview to which the charge refers, in a letter which is among those submitted by the President. The charge rests only on General Stevens' authority, and his disclaimer of it is believed to be an absolute and complete refutation of this most serious charge, At the same time no official disclaimer was ever forwarded, and the charge thus publicly disavowed in the newspapers, by the only person on whose authority it was made, remains on the files of the Department, to the great injustice and disgrace of General Benham.

This statement is supposed to be the only one of sufficient weight to have called forth the severe censure of the Department under which General Benham is suffering, and its complete refutation would, of itself, seem to be sufficient reason why that censure should be canceled and the dismissed general restored to his rank.

This document of General Stevens is important in another respect. It shows that there was no question in the mind of any general at the conference preceding the battle about any violation of orders in the prospective fight. The subject was not alluded to. Now, General Benham expressly declares that the orders of General Hunter to him were announced to the other generals of his command. This assertion, moreover, is unquestioned. They all knew under what orders he fought. It appears, then, that while the three generals were aware of those orders, no one of them alleges that they supposed General Bonham's action in ordering the battle to be a violation of them, They must be considered, therefore, to have believed his action legitimate in this respect, as he himself did. None of them supposed the battle to be in violation of General Hunter's orders. This position is substantiated by a consideration of the order of General Hunter, which General Benham is charged with violating. It is very brief, and forbids "any attempt to advance on Charleston or to attack Fort Johnson," both which prohibitions General Benham faithfully observed. It moreover enjoined him to "provide for a secure intrenched encampment, where your front can be covered by the fire of the gunboats."

This injunction he faithfully endeavored to carry out. It required him to attack a battery, which was firing into his camp, as he honestly believed; and it now appears that no one of his associate generals considered his act a violation of the instructions he had received.

Such is the bearing of the letter of General Stevens, now for the first time brought to the official notice of the President.

The other new presentation of the facts is that made in a letter already mentioned— of Colonel Hawley, Seventh Connecticut Volunteers. It speaks for itself, as a moderate, judicious, and perfectly intelligible statement of the causes of the failure of a well planned and promising attack. Colonel Hawley's letter contains so distinct an account of the action, and of its want of success, that no comment of mine is necessary. I would observe, however, that he attributes the failure to a neglect of General Stevens to provide for the proper arrangement of his regiments in regimental column. He moreover points out the headquarters of General Stevens at the first hedge, nearly a mile from the scene of the action, and in a position in which it was impossible that he could witness or direct the advance of the troops at that early hour, for the attack was ordered to take place at daylight.

If the attack failed from General Stevens' erroneous dispositions, surely great caution should be observed in admitting any statements by which he has endeavored to throw off the responsibility of concurring in it.

Moreover, Colonel Hawley, who had advanced to within 100 yards of the work when he was recalled by the aide-de-camp of General Stevens, declares that he saw no abatis or formidable ditch, and that he "attributes the failure to the adherence to the order to advance in brigade line."

It seems, therefore, that there were no circumstances which rendered the attack a foolish or desperate one, or which forbade in any way the hope of its success.

As for the statement that the generals remonstrated against it, this, as I have said, is to be received with caution, as a statement made after the disastrous failure. General Benham did not understand their inquiries as designed to express a remonstrance, and the letter already referred to of Commodore Drayton to General Benham expressly declares, "I cannot recollect any opposition being offered to your proposed advance on Secessionville, except as regards the time you had fixed on, General Stevens being in favor of deferring it until the afternoon."

This most unexceptionable testimony shows that there was no decided remonstrance whatever against the proposed movement. When subsequently it became important to evade the responsibility of having ordered or concurred in the attack, a very slight question as to its propriety was magnified into a remonstrance, by the generals, who then became able to see it as injudicious.

On the whole, then, it appears that: First, there was no remonstrance against Benham's action, as a violation of General Hunter's orders; and this is the important charge. Second. There was no idea that the attack was a violation of orders, either in the mind of General Benham or of any one of his associate generals. Third. The attack was, on his part, a simple adherence to what he supposed to be the true meaning and effect of General Hunter's order. Fourth. The attack was not extravagant or rash, and failed only from an unhappy arrangement of the troops, and not from any inherent impracticability in the work attempted.

These points General Benham considers fully proved by the testimony submitted; but if not absolutely established, thus much, at least, is clear, that the force of the charges is greatly weakened by these authentic statements. The ground of censure is brought very much into doubt; nothing whatever can by regarded as established against him. No ground is made out as clearly justifying the public severity with which he has been treated, now that General Stevens has retracted the accusation which alone seemed to call for the censure of the Department.

If there are other charges against General Benham, of which, however, the President mentioned none to me, he has no knowledge of them, and is, of course, unable to attempt a vindication of himself against them. It would seem that justice requires that he should be informed of them if such other accusations exist, and be called upon for explanation.

After having given, myself, a most careful and protracted examination to these charges, I feel entirely at liberty to say that I am fully convinced that they are wholly groundless, and that in any court in which General Benham could have the liberty of examining the parties who have made them, their futility would be made abundantly conspicuous. No one will ever give to the case the same minute examination, with the explanations of both friend and foe, that I have myself done, with clear assurance of injustice in General Benham's dismissal.

One topic remains. The inquiry suggests itself, Why should General Hunter deem his orders violated, and press the case for censure against his subordinate? The answer to this inquiry is obvious upon an examination of the case, but, it is painful to state, it. Among the papers which I left with you in the package bearing my address, is a copy of General Benham's original plan of the expedition. It bears date May 17, and was presented to General Hunter on that date, formally written at his request. The first sentence of it shows that General Benham had presented this plan more than two weeks before, upon receipt of accurate intelligence of the small number of troops then in and about Charleston. At that, time six or eight large steamers were at command in the department, and the troops could have been transported in a single day to the scene of action. General Hunter, however, hesitated to set, and the opportunity was lost. The Quartermaster General at Washington, not informed of the possible necessity of these steamers, withdrew them from the department; and when, after repeated intelligence confirming the originally known facts, General Hunter at length authorized the movement, but one or two small steamers remained. This lack of transportation involved an additional loss of many days. The attack, which should have been made early in May, was delayed for a full month. The enemy gathered re-enforcements, and the happiest plan of the war was spoiled by the indecision and tardiness of the commanding general, who now accuses the zealous subordinate, who constantly urged a more active and early attack.

If this is a true statement, it abundantly shows the animus of General Hunter's censure to be an attempt to cover his own delinquency. It can be decisively proved in every particular, as I personally know from conversation with the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Wolcott.

Pardon, sir, the zeal for a friend and for justice which prompts this long statement of the case, and believe me, with many thanks for your kindness on a previous occasion, and with the highest confidence in your impartiality,

Most sincerely and respectfully, yours,.

BENJ. N. MARTIN.

P. S. — I am concerned to remember that several of the papers to which I here refer are only copies. The circumstance arose thus: I called on the President, in order to explain the case, and to secure, if possible, a formal hearing for General Benham, in which his original documents could be presented. The President was suddenly called away, and hastily took my papers, disregarding my momentary remonstrance that they were only my own copies, as I supposed, for his own examination. He afterward concluded to refer them to yourself, and sent we with the order and the papers, which, of course, I felt bound to deliver to you untouched. General Benham most earnestly desires the opportunity of presenting original documents, should there be any question about the validity of those I have left with the President. I earnestly hope that his case may not be prejudiced for want of an opportunity of duly authenticating his statements. Full papers in Washington are in the hands of Senator Hale.

-----

Report of Lieut. Col. Ellison Capers, Twenty-fourth South Carolina.

HDQRS. TWENTY-FOURTH SOUTH CAROLINA. VOLUNTEERS,
James Island, S.C., June 23, 1862.

COLONEL: By your direction I herewith submit the following report: On the morning of the 16th instant, our regiment being on picket duty on the roads leading, respectively, to the Episcopal and Presbyterian churches and to Rivers' place, about daylight the enemy was reported advancing from Rivers', immediately on Secessionville. I accompanied you down the road toward the causeway, near the Rivers place, where Gooding's company (D), Tompkins' company (K), Wever's company (I), and Pearson's company (G) were stationed. While we were deploying these companies in the wood south of Hill's house, Colonel Hagood joined us with his own and Simonton's regiments. The enemy by this time was near the work of Secessionville, and a force had crossed to our side of the creek by the Rivers causeway, and had taken position beyond Hill's negro houses and immediately opposite the Secessionville work, and a little to the rear of its right flank. From this position we could see what a telling fire he was pouring into the battery. Meanwhile the enfilade battery in front of Clark's house was silent, and had not fired a shot. Its position enabled it to rake the front of the Secessionville work, and to fire right into the rear of the force at and beyond the negro houses. Colonel Hagood ordered me to gallop back to the battery and order it to open fire at once. This I did with all possible speed, and found Lieut. J. B. Kitching's 15 or 18 men there, belonging to Lamar's regiment. To my demand why he was not firing on the enemy, the lieutenant said that he and his men had but just come from the country, had no orders to fire, knew nothing of the service of the guns or ammunition, but would gladly fire the guns if I would direct them how to proceed. I at once loaded, sighted, and fired the right piece, the lieutenant and his men springing to the work in gallant style. The shell we fired burst just in rear of the fence beyond the Hill negro houses with fine effect on the enemy, delighting us all.

In my haste I did not notice that the guns were on separate and very narrow platforms, elevated about 2 feet. As I had trailed this gun to the right, to get a better direction, the carriage stood crossways the platform, and the recoil of this first shot dropped it off the platform and disabled the piece for the rest of the engagement. We loaded the other gun at once, and I provided against a similar accident for it, and we went ahead. Kitching and his men worked gallantly, and with remarkable aptitude, so much so that I thought it my duty to return to my command. Passing Clark's house, I reported to General Evans the above facts, and he ordered me peremptorily to return to the battery and direct its fire until relieved. This I accordingly did. We fired as rapidly as we could load, right into the troops at the negro houses and in the bushes to the east, and when they retreated we directed our fire on the force in front of Secessionville.

During the final attempt of the enemy to carry the work, the effect of our 24 pounder on his left flank was very perceptible at every discharge. I am satisfied that the fire of this battery contributed no little to our success, and am gratified to inform you that the general commanding rode to the battery during the close of the engagement and warmly thanked us for our work.

I have since had the honor to receive the thanks of the general, in writing, a copy of which I herewith inclose.

The enemy fired on us from a light battery, but did us no harm.

I am, colonel, your obedient servant,

ELLISON CAPERS,

Lieutenant-Colonel Twenty-fourth South Carolina Volunteers.

Col. C. H. STEVENS,

Twenty-fourth South Carolina.

 

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS,
James Island, June 22, 1862.

Lieutenant-Colonel CAPERS,
Twenty-fourth South Carolina, James Island:

COLONEL: In the absence of General Evans, first in command on the 16th instant, allow me to thank you and the small detachment of South Carolina Artillery under your command, for the efficient and distinguished service which was rendered by Battery Read upon that day. Make known to detachment my thanks.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. DUNCAN SMITH,

No. 2.--Return of Casualties in the Union forces.

No. 3.--Brig. Gen. Henry W. Bonham, U. S. Army, commanding Northern District, Department of the South.

No. 4.--Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.

No. 5.--Col. John L. Chatfield, Sixth Connecticut Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division.

No. 6.---Col. Henry R. Guss, Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry.

No. 7.--Col. Thomas Welsh, Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, First Division.

No. 8.--Brig. Gen. Isaac I. Stevens, U.S. Army, commanding Second Division.

No. 9.--Col. William M. Fenton, Eighth Michigan Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

No. 10.--Lieut. Col. Joseph R. Hawley, Seventh Connecticut Infantry.

No. 11.--Lieut. Col. MacLelland Moore, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Infantry.

No. 12.--Lieut. Col. Frank Graves, Eighth Michigan Infantry.

No. 13.--Col. Daniel Leasure, One hundredth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division.

No. 14.--Col. Rudolph Rosa, Forty-sixth New York Infantry.

No. 15--Lieut. Col. David Morrison, Seventy-ninth New York Infantry.

No. 16.--Maj. David A. Leckey, One hundredth Pennsylvania Infantry.

No. 17.--Col. Robert Williams, First Massachusetts Cavalry, commanding Third Brigade.

No. 18.--Lieut. Col. John H. Jackson, Third New Hampshire Infantry.

No. 19.--Capt. Alfred F. Sears, First New York Engineers.

No. 20.--Capt. Alfred P. Rockwell, First Connecticut Battery.

No. 21.--Maj. Edwin Metcalf, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

No. 22.--Capt. Lucius M. Sargent, jr., First Massachusetts Cavalry.

No. 23.--Maj. Gen. John C. Pemberton, C. S. Army, commanding Department of South Carolina and Georgia.

No. 24.--Return of Casualties in the Confederate forces.

No. 25.--Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans, C. S. Army, commanding Second Military District.

No. 26.--Col. T. G. Lamar, First South Carolina Artillery.

No. 27.--Maj. David Ramsay, First South Carolina (Charleston) Battalion.

No. 28.--Col. S. D. Goodlett, Twenty-second South Carolina Infantry.

No. 29.--Col. Johnson Hagood, First South Carolina Infantry, commanding advanced forces.

No. 30.--Lieut. Col. J. McEnery, Fourth Louisiana Battalion.

No. 31.--Col. C. H. Stevens, Twenty-fourth South Carolina Infantry.

No. 32.--Lieut. Col. Charles H. Simonton, Twenty-fifth South Carolina Infantry.

No. 33.--Lieut. R. A. Blum, Twenty-fifth South Carolina Infantry.

No. 34.--Capt. J. E. Adger, Twenty-fifth South Carolina Infantry.

 

[con't]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
Hilton Head, Port Royal, S.C., June 23, 1862.

SIR: On the 13th instant I had the honor of informing you that we had occupied the southwestern portion of James Island, on the Stono River, within 5 or 6 miles of Charleston, intending to make a rush for the reduction of that city as soon as re-enforcements should arrive. As we failed in being able to make a coup de main on Charleston in consequence of our transportation not having been returned to us from the North, the enemy had time to throw strong re-enforcements on James Island, rendering an advance with our existing force extremely hazardous. I therefore determined to make no forward movement, having satisfied myself by reconnaissances of the increase of the enemy's strength; and on leaving the Stono to return to this point, where matters affecting the safety of the command in other portions of the department called for my presence, I gave positive orders to General Benham that no advance should be made until further explicit orders had been received from these headquarters.(*) General Benham disobeyed these positive orders and clear instructions, and the result, I deeply regret to say, has been a disastrous repulse, only redeemed by the brilliant conduct of the troops while engaged ill the assault and their steadiness and patient courage when compelled to retire.

I inclose herewith a copy of General Benham's report of his assault upon the enemy's fortifications, as also of my orders forbidding that any such movement should be made. You will see that General Benham endeavors to evade the responsibility of having violated his instructions by terming his attack upon the enemy's works a "reconnaissance in force," but such a plea is too puerile to deserve consideration.

In view of these circumstances and the serious consequences which have arisen from his disobedience I have felt it my duty to arrest General Benham and order him North by the steamer conveying this letter. This step has cost me much regret, as previous to this unhappy act of rashness he has been industrious, energetic, and wholly devoted to his duties.

We still hold our former position, and shall continue to hold it so long as any hope of being enabled to make it useful by the receipt of re-enforcements shall remain. It is a most valuable point d'appui for operations against Charleston, and should not lightly be abandoned.

From all the evidence reaching me, however, I am satisfied that Charleston has been heavily re-enforced of late, possibly by some brigades from the Army of Corinth; and the injudicious attack of General Benham will doubtless contribute, both by its calling attention to the place and by the eclat of the Confederate success there, to still fur; her swell the number of its defenders.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,.

D. HUNTER,

Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

Secretary of War, Washington.

-----

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
Hilton Head, Port Royal, S.C., June 27, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith letters of Brig. Gen. H. G. Wright and Brig. Gen. I. I. Stevens, with explanatory copies of the letter of Brigadier-General Benham, to which they refer, and my letter of instructions to Brigadier-General Benham, dated June 10; also copy of General Benham's report of the action of the 16th instant on James Island.

You will see from the letters of General Wright and General Stevens that, in a council of war held On the evening previous to the attack, these officers, together with Colonel Williams, also commanding a brigade, remonstrated strongly and emphatically with General Benham, and warned him that he was about to fight a battle in violation of orders.

If consistent with the interests of the service, in your judgment, the publication, by transmission to Congress or otherwise, of this correspondence would greatly aid in setting this department right before the country.

I have the honor also to transmit herewith copy of my letter of instructions to Brig. Gen. H. G. Wright, directing the withdrawal of our forces from James Island to some more healthy location. The military reasons making this course advisable are fully set forth in the letter and the increasing sick list from the command is another argument not to be overlooked.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,.

D. HUNTER, .

Major-General, Commanding..

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

 

[Inclosure No. 1]

HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES,
James Island, S.C., June 22, 1862.

Maj. CHARLES G. HALPINE,
A. A. G., Hdqrs. Dept. of the South, Hilton Head, S.C.:

MAJOR: I have the honor to inclose a communication from Brig. Gen. I. I. Stevens in reference to General Benham's letter of the 20th instant regarding our attack upon Secessionville.

I fully indorse all that is said by General Stevens in his letter, and repudiate as emphatically as he has done for himself any attempt to use my name as favoring the operations of the 16th instant. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,.

H. G. WRIGHT,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

 

[Sub-inclosure]

HDQRS. 1ST DIV., NORTH. DIST., DEPT. OF THE SOUTH,
Smith's Island, S.C., June 22, 1862.

Capt. E. W. SMITH,
A. A. A. G., Dept. of the South, Hilton Head, S.C.:

CAPTAIN: I have received a copy of General Benham's communication of the 20th instant in regard to the attack on Secessionville. I repudiate the use he attempts to make of my name. On the evening before the battle, at a conference invited by him, and at which were present General Wright, Colonel Williams, and myself, General Benham was most distinctly warned that under his orders we were going out to fight a battle. General Wright made the statement to General Benham, and it was most positively and unequivocally concurred in by both Colonel Williams and myself. I was utterly opposed to the attack on Secessionville on the morning of the 16th, and so expressed myself unequivocally in conference. I also understood unequivocally that General Wright and Colonel Williams were opposed to it. Much more might be said on this subject, but I forbear.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,.

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

 

[lnclosure No. 2]

HILTON HEAD, S.C., June 20, 1862.

Capt. E. W. SMITH,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of the South:

SIR: As you did not mention the cause of my arrest last evening while notifying me thereof, yet, as I understood from my previous conversation with General Hunter that it would be on the ground that I had disobeyed his orders against making an advance toward Fort Johnson or Charleston, I desire to lay before him one or two considerations in relation to this matter which I think have an important bearing on the case, but which were not, I believe, brought to his notice in the conversation I had with him on the subject last evening; and while disclaiming, as it is true and my duty to myself to do, most fully and completely any other intention than that of carrying out his orders to the strictest letter, as it has always been my wish and my pleasure to do, I cannot avoid stating that it is as strongly impressed on my mind as possible that after the receipt of the written orders as to the disposition of the troops and the non-advance upon Charleston, upon the evening prior to his leaving I showed him the map (as I have it here now with a line upon it) drawn from the church (where Colonel Morrow's skirmish was) "to the north of the isthmus, where the Secessionville tower and fort are," stating that as that fort shelled our upper camp I considered it indispensable that we should have and hold those points for the security of our camps and even for the occupation of the Stone, and that I understood him distinctly as assenting to and approving of my representation. But, more than this, and what I would respectfully ask his consideration of, in addition to the explanation I offered last evening, is the fact that the battery just in front of General Stevens' advanced position was projected and being built to attack the fort at Secessionville before General Hunter left, and this was known to and as I understood approved of by him, and I could not but suppose that if I was authorized to construct such a work to disable or destroy a fort whose fire covered our camps and failed in so destroying it (a work which I feared would be a good foundation for driving us from the Stone entirely) I should be fully authorized in taking it if possible by a direct attack; or, in other words, while only holding our present camps and without an advance toward Charleston I was authorized and expected, if it were possible, to keep the front of our camps clear of the works of the enemy far beyond cannon range, and beyond that range even on the day of the action I would not allow our troops to pass as was proposed by going farther to our left, because my object was simply to make secure the present position of our camps, which I considered it my duty to protect against the fire of the enemy. The orders of General Hunter I may say were made known to General Stevens and General Wright, and neither of them ever intimated or appeared to think that the reconnaissance upon the fort upon the 16th would be contrary to those orders--orders which I most heartily approved and was most anxious to carry out.

I may say in addition that the demonstration was made only after the fullest reasons for being assured of success and with the greatest apparent necessity for it.

The deserters who arrived from Secessionville gave information separately, confirmed by prisoners taken on the day of the action and in part by our own officers who mounted the parapet, that the fort was only a common earthwork, without a stockade, and with abatis only in part; that it mounted only four to six guns, and that six or seven more, with their carriages, were at hand ready for mounting, and that the garrison was not more than two battalions there and in Secessionville. Add to this the active operations which we could see and hear going on for strengthening and perfecting the work during the two days of our ineffective artillery fire upon it, with the fear that bomb-proofs would be erected, the additional guns mounted, and probably a stockade and abatis soon completed, it appeared indispensable to make the effort at once to take it before it should be brought to its greatest strength, and though I did not doubt that 2,000 men would have amply sufficed, the large force was brought out that no doubt of success might exist.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,.

H. W. BENHAM,

Brigadier-General.

 

[Inclosure No. 3.1

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
On board U. S. Transport Delaware, Stono River, S.C., June 10, 1862.

Brig. Gen. H. W. BENHAM,
Comdg. Northern District, Department of the South:

SIR: In leaving the Stono River to return to Hilton Head I desire, in any arrangements that you may make for the disposition of your forces now in this vicinity, you will make no attempt to advance on Charleston or to attack Fort Johnson until largely re-enforced or until you receive specific instructions from these headquarters to that effect. You will however provide for a secure intrenched encampment, where your front can be covered by the fire of our gunboats from the Stono on the left and the creek from Folly River on the right. After making all proper arrangements for the security of the camp, and the necessary provision for quartermaster's, commissary, and medical stores, if in your judgment you can safely leave the position you will return to your usual headquarters at Hilton Head, reporting to me verbally the state of affairs here; or, if delayed, reporting in writing by each boat that may leave here previously. You will be especially careful to have the free communication established and kept up by the repairs of the causeway between the old battery and Cole's Island.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,.

D. HUNTER,

Major-General, Commanding.

 

[Inclosure No. 4]

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
James Island, S.C., June 25, 1862.

Col. D. LEASURE,
Commanding Second Brigade, First Division:

COLONEL: In your report(*) to General Stevens of the operations of your brigade on the morning of the 16th instant, in the attack upon the enemy's works at Secessionville, I find the following:(+)

After I had formed my command behind the hedge, ready to move again to the attack, I rode down to the troops lying back half a mile, in reserve behind a hedge, and begged them, for God's sake, to come up to the front and support, me in a charge, and was very coolly told that these troops did not belong to my division and could not obey either my orders or General Stevens'. Of course this was a very distant support, and I did not feel at liberty to take the responsibility of acting without orders of General Stevens.

I desire to know to what troops you refer as lying half a mile behind and to what officer you applied for assistance, and also whether you applied to your division commander; to Acting Brigadier General Williams, who was acting with him, and who was seldom 150 yards behind the hedge first, referred to; to myself, when near that hedge, where the One hundredth Pennsylvania Regiment was reformed, or to General Benham, who commanded the whole. You will understand, colonel, that troops on a field cannot be moved without proper orders, and that any appeal of yours, however correct, must have been useless unless made to some authority competent to give the order; hence the state-meat above quoted does great injustice to all the troops not of your immediate brigade, and requires that you should specify in the most distinct manner the officer in authority to whom you made the appeal to which you refer. An early reply is desired, in order that the reports of the battle may be submitted without unnecessary delay. There were no troops, that I am aware of, as far as a quarter of a mile in rear of the hedge behind which you reformed your command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,.

H. G. WRIGHT,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

 

[Inclosure No 5]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
Hilton Head, Port Royal, S.C., June 27, 1862.

Brig. Gen. H. G. WRIGHT,
Commanding U.S. Forces on James Island, S.C.:

GENERAL: Hearing from Washington that there is no probability of our receiving re-enforcements, and it being all-important to provide for the health of the command in the sickly season approaching, I have determined to abandon James Island, in order that the troops may be placed where, in so far as practicable in this climate, they may be out of the way of malarious influences, and where the picket duty will not be so exhausting on our men as at present.

In making this retrograde movement you will be governed by the instructions contained in my letter of the 19th instant, so far as they are applicable to this movement. You will, however, leave two regiments at North Edisto in addition to the one now there, remaining there yourself in command. The other regiments will be ordered to this place under Brig. Gen. I. I. Stevens, and will be here distributed. All the stores brought from the Stono and needed at Edisto will be transferred to the latter place. I send you the Vanderbilt, Locust Point, Ben De Ford, Potomac, &c., all towing schooners. Take your time, and do not allow the transports to be overloaded. If you think best you can march over John's Island with the two regiments for North Edisto. After the sick and stores and your first detachment have been embarked you will transfer all the remaining portion of your command to the right bank of the Stono at Legareville. The smaller steamers will of course be used in towing in and out the schooners, and as there need be no hurry, a few days' delay for good weather will not be objectionable.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. HUNTER,

Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
Hilton Head, Port Royal, S.C., July 10, 1862.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Washington:

SIR: I have the honor of transmitting to you herewith duplicate of a letter addressed to me by Brig. Gen. Isaac I. Stevens, giving particulars of the protest made by the council of war against General Benham's action in ordering the attack upon the enemy's fortifications on James Island.

You will see from it, in a full detail of the conversation which transpired, that all three division commanders--Generals Wright and Stevens and Colonel Williams--agreed with me in the opinion which had led me to issuing the order that no such attack should be made, and that all represented the movement as one almost impossible of accomplishment. "General Benham, however," adds General Stevens, "overruled all our objections, and peremptorily ordered the attack to be made."

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,.

D. HUNTER,

Major-General, Commanding.

 

[Inclosure]

HEADQUARTERS STEVENS' DIVISION,
Hilton Head, S.C., July 8, 1862.

SIR: I desire to state briefly a few facts in relation to the operations of my division at the battle of Secessionville, fought on the 16th of June, in relation to which there is some strange misapprehension; to present some of my own views in relation to that affair, and some particulars of the conference held by General Benham with his general officers on the evening previous to the battle.

1. That conference was held with Generals Wright and Williams and myself. All were unmistakably opposed to the attempt, in the then condition of the enemy's works, to take them by a coup de main, and so unequivocally and unmistakably expressed themselves. When General Wright was called on for his opinion he answered that he would make his reply in the shape of certain interrogatories to me, to which he desired answers.

First interrogatory. Have you impaired the strength of the enemy's works at Secessionville by the firing of your battery?

General Stevens' answer. Not in the least. I have driven the enemy from his guns by my fire and I can do it again, but as soon as the fire ceases he returns. I have not dismounted a gun, and we shall find him in the morning as strong as ever.

Second interrogatory. Do you know of any instance where volunteer troops have successfully stormed works as strong as those which defend the approach to Secessionville?

General Stevens' answer. I know of no such instance.

Third interrogatory. Have you any reason to believe that the result in the present case will be different in its character from what it has invariably been heretofore?

General Stevens' answer. I have no reason to expect a different result. It is simply a bare possibility to take the work.

In this Generals Wright, Williams, and myself concurred.

I then proceeded to state, with all possible emphasis, my objections to his morning attack. I urged that it should be deferred to a much later period in the day; that we should first shake the morale of the garrison, and endeavor to weaken its defenses by a continuous fire of the battery and of the gunboats; that in the mean time we should carefully survey the ground and prepare our troops, and make the attack when the battery and the boats had had the desired effect. I closed by saying that under such circumstances I could do more with 2,000 men than I could with 3,000 men in the way he proposed. General Wright, moreover, warned General Benham that his orders were in fact orders to fight a battle. In this General Williams and myself in express terms concurred. General Benham, however, overruled all our objections, and peremptorily ordered the attack to be made. I assured him, as did the other gentlemen, that he should rely upon my promptitude and activity in obeying his orders, but I considered myself as obeying orders to which I had expressed the strongest possible objections, and I therefore determined there should not be the least want of energy or promptitude on my part.

2. It has been charged that I was behind time. This is not true. I was exceedingly prompt and up to time. The orders were to move at 4 o'clock. My division was formed at 2 o'clock, and was at the outer pickets before 3.30 o'clock. It was a very dark and cloudy morning. I moved at 4 o'clock. It was so dark that one man could not follow another except at very short intervals. It was much darker than on usual starlight nights. My men were at the enemy's works about 4.30 o'clock, and the conflict of twenty-five minutes, so dreadful in its casualties, was over, and the men returned at 5 o'clock. Porter's section of Rockwell's battery advanced to the hedge within 500 yards of the enemy's works with the troops of Fenton's brigade; fired above 100 shots from his two guns; was joined in the midst of his fire by one piece of Seward's section (a rifled gun, which fired 20 shots, and the three guns were withdrawn to the second hedge and actually there reopened fire at 5 o'clock. The watch was actually consulted by one of Rockwell's sergeants at the very moment, and it was exactly 5 o'clock.

In my official report I have stated that the sharp conflict was from 5 to 5.30. I am perfectly satisfied that it occurred between 4.30 and 5. The men moved very rapidly from the pickets to the work--much of the time at the double-quick, and they moved that distance in about half an hour.

3. It has been stated that my regiments were not within supporting distance of each other. This is a great mistake. They followed each other closely. There was not a pause in the movement. They entered successively under fire without hesitation. They entered necessarily in the following order: Eighth Michigan, Seventh Connecticut, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, Seventy-ninth (Highlanders), One hundredth Pennsylvania, and Forty-sixth New York. They moved at first by the flank on the road to avoid ditches and hedges and the rough cotton-furrows, and they necessarily marched one behind the other. As they came into the field before the work they pushed forward by regiments into line of battle and entered the close fire.

I have mentioned how Rockwell's battery pushed up. Quite a number of the Eighth Michigan and Seventy-ninth (Highlanders) gained the ditch and parapet of the work. All the regiments pushed close up to the work, and more or less men of each made lodgments at the marsh and abatis on either side. The Seventy-ninth Highlanders went into fire the fourth regiment. They passed by the Seventh Connecticut and «4 R--VOL XIV

the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, and actually supported at the parapet, as every one admits, the Eighth Michigan. They passed those regiments, too, within less than 200 yards of the enemy's work.

The Highlanders have been in many battles and skirmishes, are very expert in drill, and are indeed old soldiers. If they were in supporting distance certainly the Seventh Connecticut and the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts were, but the terrible fire of grape, canister, and musketry from the front, and the rifle-fire of sharpshooters from the flanks, poured upon the several regiments as they were passing on in line to the very neck of land on which the enemy's work is situated, and which is stated by them to be only 30 yards wide. Large portions of each regiment were thus thrown on the marsh on either hand and were unable to go forward. The succeeding regiments in pushing forward became intermingled with them, and the only alternative was to retire the regiments to reform them.

The very thing happened which is to be feared in such an attempt. When it is recollected that in twenty five minutes every one of my regiments passed the advanced hedge, pushed clear up or nearly clear up to the ditch, made the best fight they could, and were withdrawn by my positive orders to the same advanced hedge again, losing over 500 men, every regiment suffering largely and two regiments terribly, there can be no doubt but they followed each other closely. The fault is not in my orders or arrangements, but in having a fight there at all under such circumstances.

4. So rapid and prompt were the operations of my division that I was hard at work reforming my troops before Williams' advance came in sight, and I was afterwards ready with all my battalions in line of battle to move to the assault of the works the second time whenever General Benham should give the order.

This I announced to General Benham by Captain Elwell, his aide, and by officers of my own staff. At this very juncture General Benham withdrew Williams, and, as stated in my official report, at a subsequent period ordered me to withdraw.

5. All the above facts I can establish by the most incontrovertible testimony. I have entered the service with the earnest purpose of doing my duty, and submit the above statements to show that I was prompt and faithful to my orders on the day of the 16th.

I am, sir, very respect